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Abstract: There may be good theological reasons for adopting one or the other 
of the two “God-world”-relations: “God’s acting upon the world” vs. “God’s 
not acting upon the world”, from a philosophical/metaphysical point of view, 
these options pose a “decision-problem”. The article is in search for 
metaphysical criteria that support any decision on behalf of “God’s acting vs. 
His not acting upon the world”. In this, it is meta-metaphysical in character. 
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“How is it possible that God acts upon the world?” For Christians that are faithful to 
the biblical narratives, to God’s revelation, to their religious practices and traditions, 
the question presumably sounds pointless.1 As is well-known, the question has two 
different, inconsistent and extreme answers: One answer is: He cannot act. The other 
answer is: What else could He do? Both answers are not better than the embedding 
theoretical, better: metaphysical, frameworks. Inconsistent as the answers are, so are 
the embedding frameworks and by this their different notions of God: roughly, His 
being transcendent vs. His being immanent. This has as consequence that the answers 
are rooted in fundamentally different relations of God and “world”. Theories that 
conceive of God as being transcendent are called classical theisms here. Anselm of 
Canterbury’s Monologion is taken as a point of reference. Theories that regard God as 
being immanent are called alternative theisms here. As a proto-type for them, A. N. 
Whitehead’s Process and Reality is taken.  
May be that there are good theological reasons for adopting one or the other of 
the two “God-world”-relations, it is not a philosophy’s or metaphysic’s task to decide 
upon. Philosophy, however, can address the aforementioned impasse: “God’s acting 
upon the world” vs. “God’s not acting upon the world”, from a meta-theoretical or 
methodological perspective. The meta-metaphysical or methodological task 
concerning the impasse may be called, for better or worse, “metaphysical decision-
problem” (henceforth, “decision-problem”). There is no decision without criteria – if 
                                                          
1 When using the words “God“, “theology“, “religious practice“ and so forth in this article, it is 
always the Christian tradition that is referred to. 
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it should be “rational”. Moreover, applying the criteria to the different answers must 
make a difference. And here, the problem shows up: Are their metaphysical criteria 
that support any decision on behalf of “God’s acting vs. His not acting upon the 
world”? Trying an answer to this question is the main task of the present article. So, 
the article is neither about screening the various theories of “God’s acting upon the 
world” taking argued side with one or another answer, nor about proposing a 
resolution of its own.2 The article can be regarded as a specific exercise in what is 
today called meta-metaphysics.3 
In metaphysical respects, the phrase: “God’s acting upon the world?” is a 
borderline-case: It contains three notions – God, world, acting/action -, each of which 
indicates a philosophical problem of its own. The border is marked by the word(s) 
acting/action. In section I a minimalist notion of acting/action is formulated and by 
this the meta-theoretical role of “world” has to be considered. 
Since the impasse shows up as a conflict between different theoretical 
frameworks, the general architectural sources of the impasse must be scrutinized. To 
fix ideas, two frameworks are taken as platforms – Anselm’s and Whitehead’s. Both are 
elaborate and variegated theological and metaphysical worlds. Due to restrictions of 
space, the presentation will be rather tight. This is the task of section II. 
The problem of criteria is taken up in section III. Of course, theology is a 
discipline of its own; it is not drowned in metaphysics. The decision-problem here is 
seen as metaphysical/philosophical decision-problem and not a decision-problem for 
theology. Conceived of as a theological decision-problem, the criteria are different. 
So, the criteria to be formulated are meta-metaphysical in character and not special 
for certain applications of metaphysical theories; one may call them – for better or 
worse – formal criteria.  
Finally, section IV, formulates the consequence of the preceding reflections: 
The issue of God’s acting vs. God’s not acting upon the world is metaphysically un-
decidable. 
 
I. Acting and World 
 
The word “acting” in the phrase “God’s acting upon the world” indicates the 
aforementioned borderline character of the problem. The word “acting” (and 
cognates) tends to be a trouble-maker in metaphysical contexts.4 Irrespective of that, 
it is a core-notion of the issue at hand. Therefore, the understanding of the word 
must be clarified for the present purpose in a way that is as minimalistic and neutral 
as possible.  
 
                                                          
2 A great part of the European Journal of Philosophy of Religion, vol. 7, (4), 2015 is devoted to this topic. 
3 The relation of Philosophy and Theology is dealt in depth in Puntel (2010:  279), specifically in 285-
290.  
4 The word “upon” is also a trouble-maker– but this topic is not the focus the present article. 
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I. (i) Acting – Local, Direct and Creative 
 
Intuitively, human beings “act in the world”. They act, if they intervene intentionally, 
with control and reflection in the world at a specific time and at a specific place. That 
is, they bring about changes in the world - at a specific time and at a specific place. This 
feature of acting may be called locality and an action of this kind a local action. The 
consequences of such an action are – at least in principle – public and often physical. 
Moreover, if a human being acts in this sense, it brings about a state of affairs (at a 
specific time and at a specific place) of the world that would not have been obtained 
or happened without that action. That means, in acting a human being is somehow 
creative for the state of affairs that it brings about – it is not only a medium of sorts 
for change or for “law-like” propagation. Of course, acting in this sense is restricted 
but not determined by the “physical laws”. An action in this sense can be called direct 
action. This is a characterization of a very strong version of agent-causation.5  
In acting, humans are usually aware of acting now. An act, being intentional 
and controlled, presupposes that the acting human being is responsive to the world he 
is up to change. A human action temporarily separates the states (or phases) of the 
world in those obtaining before the action and those that come after the action as 
well as temporal internal states (phases) of human beings. 
Analogously, God is acting upon the world, if He brings about a state of affairs 
within the world - at a specific time and at a specific place - that would have not 
obtained without His action and that is not mediated by otherwise worldly 
circumstances, including human actions. It is creative, local and direct and He is 
responsive to the world. Note that the word “responsive” (and cognates) is understood 
in a very minimalistic and sparse fashion. In that sense, also a machine can be 
responsive: It can control another machine and stop it, if it registers a malfunctioning 
of it. In stopping the controlled machine, the controlling machine can stop also. But 
of course, there can be more about responsiveness. But for the present purpose, a 
minimal reading of “responsive” is sufficient. 
In passing by, it is to be noticed that this strong agent-causal understanding 
God’s acting in the world is not God’s creation (ex nihilo) of the world. That is a topic 
of genuine importance. Just to indicate the difference: creation ex nihilo does not 
presuppose a world – the world is up to be created. “God’s acting in the world” 
presupposes a (created) world. A world that has had a history before God’s creative, 
local and direct takes place. Also conservatio, God‘s conservation of the world (and 
associated with this, God as actus purus) cannot be understood in the sense relevant 
here. Conservation may be an effect of God’s being, but it is of a general and not of a 
local nature. In the same vein, the concursus dei is not an action in the relevant sense, 
since it is a mediated and not a direct acting of God’s.6  
                                                          
5 A possibility to formulate coherently strong agent-causation, can be found in Schneider (2009: 134) . 
6 Conservatio as well as concursus dei can be regarded as theoretical notions (within the framework of 
classical theisms), weakening a strong reading of “acting” to keep the tension between God’s great-
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A metaphysical theory that articulates agency as creative, local and direct - on 
behalf of mundane entities or of God - has to respect some minimalistic assumptions 
concerning its articulation of the “world”. These are: The notion of world must allow 
either for agency as a creative, local and direct intervention in the temporal course of the 
world.7 
 
I. (ii) In Need of Ontology 
 
Acting as intervening locally and direct in the course of the “world” is inherently 
bound to ontology. So, any metaphysical theory that endorses that its “God acts 
upon the world”  must include or presuppose a rather elaborate ontology – for its 
sub-theory of “world”, if not for its God – to grant and to show that its theoretical 
interpretation of the phrase “God’s acting upon the world” is coherent and not of the 
kind of a squared circle.8 As a consequence, only metaphysical theories that endorse 
a responsive God, who acts locally, directly and creative upon the world, and 
formulate or presuppose an ontology, are at stake here. Metaphysical theories, as 
classical theisms, that regard their God as being transcendent and by this as not acting 
locally and directly upon the world can be more liberal about the ontologies of their 
metaphysical frameworks.  Classical theisms, including Anselm’s approach that is 
taken as point of reference here, tend to endorse a substance-ontology. 
Superfluous to mention that Whitehead’s theory comes with a very elaborate 
ontology – an ontology which includes changing entities and endorses a God who 
changes responsively in or with the world and with the changing entities. As it 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
making attributes and the biblical testimony of His engagement with His creation, His responsiveness, 
His great doings, under control.  
7 Contemporary analytic philosophy would count any intervention in the law-full propagation of the 
world by non-physical agents as wrongheaded. Reading the word “world” as including whatever 
physics is talking and theorizing about, it faces a problem – if not the problem for analytic theology in 
this context: the assumption of the causal closure of the physical world. If it is held to be a non-revisable 
corollary of sorts of the physical sciences, there is no way for God to intervene from “the outside into 
the physical domain”, since whatever he is to bring about in “the world” is generally (also) physical. 
Moreover, the assumption of the causal closure of the physical also prevents any agency as creative, local 
and direct. That means, adopting this principle is adopting a “world” that is simply not made for being 
acted-upon by humans and by God. The assumption of the causal closure itself is problematic and an 
intricate topic that cannot be argued here. 
8 Ontologies may be characterized by Campbell’s Axiom of Uniformity:  “Fundamental to the 
ontological impulse is what we might call the Axiom of Uniformity, the conviction that someone basic 
pattern pervades the universe; the proper ontological assay of any one region or sub-part of the whole 
will mirror the assay elsewhere. There are pervasive basic constituents and pervasive basic structures 
in which they play always the same roles. At the ultimate level, the universe has a common structure 
throughout. The pervasive elements, the constantly recurring items in ontological assays, are the 
categories.“ (Campbell 1990: 1). An ontology is a theory that is up to make the pervasive basic 
constituents or structures “in which they play always the same roles” as well as their interplay explicit. 
It should be kept in mind: An ontology is not necessarily only a theory about “the world”.  
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seems, it is the strongest and most elaborate theory/ontology available. This is the 
reason to take it as a proto-type for further investigation.  
 
II. Two Theoretical Families of Frameworks 
 
So far, nearly nothing has been said about “God” or “the concept of God”. That may 
seem astonishing, not least because agency does not take place without an agent. But 
here, in the first place, it is a theory’s relation of God and “world” – transcendence vs. 
immanence - at stake, not primarily a concept of God. Nevertheless, a concept of God 
may induce a specific “God-world”-relation, but it may also be the other way round. 
Theories that endorse transcendence as their “God-world”-relation, and with this a 
God, who is not responsive – whatever they may say else about Him, are called 
classical theisms here. For historical investigations, this classification is clearly too 
coarse-grained. But for the reflections to follow, it is adequate – provided 
“transcendence” is clarified. 
Things change for theories that regard God as acting upon the world – i.e.: as 
an agent -, as bringing about a state of affairs (states of affairs) within the world - at a 
specific time and at a specific place - that would have not obtained without His action 
and that is not mediated by otherwise worldly circumstances, then their God has, at 
least, temporal aspects (before acting – after acting). By acting, He is not only 
correlated to the world – “performing” smoothly with the “world”.  To preserve the 
specific relation that is indicated by acting locally, directly and creatively upon the 
world, God must be regarded as being responsive to the world, i.e.: any strict 
asymmetry between God and the “world” must be avoided. The avoidance of strict 
asymmetry and with this of God’s being responsive to the world can be called 
immanence. Theisms that conceive of their God as immanent (and responsive) are 
called alternative theisms here. 
So, the difference between God as transcendent and God as being immanent, is 
basically whether a theory exploits any of its God-world-relations as being strictly 
asymmetric or not. In this abstract manner, the difference on behalf of God is only 
whether He is responsive to the world or not. Classical and alternative theisms are the 
two families of theisms at stake here. 
 
II. (i) Classical Theisms 
 
Classical Theisms’ God is transcendent. That is, there is one and only one specific 
relation from God to the world: His creatio ex nihilo of the “world”. Generally, classical 
theisms’ God – speaking in a coarse grained manner – is characterized as almighty, 
all-good, omniscient, immutable – He has all the great-making attributes, all 
perfections, He is the ens perfectissimum. Classical theisms’ God is an “omniGod”. By 
this, He is impassible and a-temporal and so on. Generally, He is one in the strongest 
sense: He has no internal differentiation, no “parts” of any sort – this is His simplicity. 
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By this, He is a-temporal, eternal and transcendent. His transcendence is a 
consequence of His simplicity. But that must not be the case, as will be seen later.  
If any of His great-making attributes should indicate a “God-world”- relation 
– as, e.g. omniscience –, this relation is not specific for the world and is completely a-
symmetric, i.e.: If His creatures have any relation to Him, this relation too is 
completely a-symmetric and has no impact of any sort on Him. Any symmetric 
relations are either internal to God or internal to the world. Conceiving the “God-
world”-relation that way – i.e.: completely asymmetric -, will be called 
transcendent/transcendence in what follows. 
Anselm of Canterbury’s great systematic theological (and philosophical) work – 
the Monologion – reflects the architecture hinted at above and is both: one of the most 
radical, elaborate and stringent expositions of classical theism and an impressive 
combination of thematic complexity, theoretical simplicity (in the best sense of the 
word) and argumentative and logical rigor.  It drives God’s aseity and simplicity to its 
extreme. Explaining and defending God’s aseity is the source of the thematic 
complexity whereas the work’s theoretical simplicity is rooted in God’s simplicity. 
This is the reason, why it is taken here as a proto-type for classical theisms. 
Some features of the over-all architecture of Anselm’s concept of God and its 
implications that are relevant for the present purpose should be addressed: 
Superfluous to mention, the basic framework of Anselm’s theory has neo-platonic and 
Augustinian roots as well as an adoption of Aristotelian substance-ontology – at least 
for mundane purposes. Concerning this ontology, especially the category of 
substance, however, Anselm sees that his God cannot be captured by this framework 
(“Quod non contineatur in communi tractatu substantiarum, et tamen sit substantia et 
individuus spiritus” (Anselm, Monologion: ch. 27)). But he uses this expression, for his 
God is an individual with an essence. Due to being supreme, He is “spirit”. 
At the beginning in chapter 1 – 4 of the Monologion the platonic framework – 
dwelling on participation - is used to prove that there is one and only one supreme 
good (summum bonum), one and only one summum magnum (ch. 1, 2), one and only 
one esse per se ipsum (ch. 3) and one and only one “highest nature” (Es igitur ex 
necessitate aliqua natura, quae sic est alicui vel aliquibus superior, et null sit cui ordinetur 
inferior,  ch. 4) By way of proving existence and uniqueness, Anselm purports to prove 
also that these maxima are one – the highest being.9 This, however, is not enough to 
show the simplicity of this highest being. This is taken up in the chs. 16 and 17. The 
reflections in ch. 16 may be interpreted as saying that the highest goods that are to be 
said of the summa natura are not (most perfect or “positive”) attributes (in modern 
terms: predicates) to be attached to it. The summa natura is identical to all these 
perfections – it is the justice, or: … the summa sapientia, summa veritas, sum 
incoruptibilitas, summa immutabilitas, …, summa aeternitas, …summe ens, summe vivens, 
et alia similiter. In ch. 17 Anselm identifies these summa. In other words: the summa 
                                                          
9 Here, his inferences are problematic, to say the least. But the problems are healed in Proslogion, ch. 5 
with the help of Proslogion, ch. 2. To enter into this problem and its solution is not the present concern. 
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natura cannot be a “bundle” of these “perfections”, this would make it a compound 
thing and with this, everything that must be said about compound things – as being  
compound – must be said about it: “… haec omnia quae omni composito insunt, in 
illam incidere necesse est.” For Anselm, this is absurd (nefas falsitas). Simplicity plays 
an important role to infer that this summa natura is a-temporal and neither at nor in 
places. It is not in space and time, it is “with” space and time (ch. 22), it cannot be 
affected by accidents (but it can be in relation to something else, provided that this 
relatedness does not induce any change in God), (ch. 25). That is transcendence at its 
best – inferred from simplicity.  
A theoretical framework that conceives of God in that way, faces a bulk of 
problems, if this notion should be, one way or another, co-referential with the biblical 
notion of God. Of course, also the biblical God and the God of religious practices is 
everlasting, omniscient and all-mighty, He is the supreme being, beyond human 
understanding. But, the biblical God is also responsive to the world, to human fate, 
to good and bad actions of humans, to human prayers and so on. These features, not 
least His responsiveness, make Him - prima facie - mutable, make Him revising his 
creation. By human freedom, His knowledge seems somehow reduced, He learns, 
and so on. An impressive example for the consequences Anselm’s notion of God has 
for the biblical God or the God of religious practices is the following passage:  
 
“Quomodo ergo es et non es misericors, Domine, nisi quia es miseicors secundum nos, et non 
secundum te? Es quippe secundum nostrum sensum, et non es secundum tuum. Etenim cum 
respicis nos miseros, nos sentimus misericordis effectum, tu non sentis affectum.“ (Anselm 
Anselm, Proslogion: chap. 8). 
 
Classical theisms have their problems to apply their concept of God to the biblical and 
religious pre-theoretic, non-theoretic, notion of God, to the religious beliefs and 
practices of Christian tradition. Is it not the case that God responds to human actions, 
especially free human actions? Is His responding to prayers not a sign of His 
Goodness? His responding, however, contradicts His impassibility. Classical theisms 
are in tension with “human freedom” and with “the evil in the world”. Without a 
severe reinterpretation, these data are hardly to be harmonized with classical theisms’ 
notion of God.10 The ways to resolve these tensions are numerous in the tradition of 
classical theism, theodicies, interpreting miracles and so on are points in case.11 Finally, 
for classical theisms, the answer to the question “How is it possible that God acts upon 
the world?” simply is: It is not possible at all. And so, it is rather natural, that Anselm 
                                                          
10 E.g.: In his book Time and Eternity (1991), Brian Leftow tries to resolve - by revision of the notion of 
time - the tensions that ensue by “God’s eternity”. 
11 Similarly, in making sense of “human freedom”, God’s omniscience or God’s knowledge of future 
contingents is plagued with tensions that are rooted in classical theisms’ notion of God. For a possible 
resolution, see  Brüntrup, G. and Schneider, R. (2016). 
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does not address God’s agency as direct and local in his Monologion. Agency with 
respect to Good is creatio ex nihilo (chs. 6 - 15).  
 
II. (ii) Whitehead’s Ontology an Elaborate Example 
 
Classical theisms’ God is hardly to be conceived of as being worth of worship, praise 
or obedience, so it is said. Charles Hartshorne – a, if not the, founder of process-
theology - writes in answering Anselm’s aforementioned proposal to reconcile God’s 
impassibility with His misericordia: Anselm can give us: “everything except the right 
to believe that there is one who, […], rejoices in all our joys and sorrows in all our 
sorrows” (Hartshorn 1948: S. 54d)12. This is clearly and emphatically against God’s 
impassibility and with this against an important feature of the classical theisms’ God. 
Impassibility, so the implicit message of Hartshorn’s, disparages religious beliefs and 
practices – it turns them senseless. Consequently, if impasses of the aforementioned 
sort should be avoided, then, since they are rooted in classical theisms’ concept of God, 
a different concept of God enters the agenda. And there are different alternative 
concepts of God.13 
Since “God’s acting upon the world” as local and direct is theoretically at 
stake, alternatives are in need of both: a “God-world”-relation that avoids strict 
asymmetry and an ontology  that is adequate for being acted upon and coherent with 
God’s responsiveness. In short, it must make explicit God’s immanence. Immanence, in 
a very abstract manner, means here that there are symmetric “God-world”-relations, 
coming in general with an index for “time” and indicate “God influences the world 
at t and the world (or some of its inhabitants) influences God at t (or ∂t)”. 
A framework different from classical theisms’ is needed. Fortunately, there is 
one: Whitehead‘s philosophy of organism as it is most famously formulated in Process 
and Reality. It can serve as the theoretical reference-frame for different theisms that - 
different as the motives may be - conceive of their God as being responsive to “the 
world”, being immanent. Variants of open theisms or process-theisms are points in case. 
As a metaphysical framework, Whitehead’s philosophy of organisms, has something to 
offer: There is an elaborate, albeit abstract, notion of God in Process and Reality. This 
notion is embedded in an elaborate and coherent metaphysical framework. It comes 
with a refined ontology.  
Whitehead’s intention was not to formulate a “theory of God” or a metaphysical 
theory in order to resolve theoretical problems concerning theology. According to L. 
S. Ford, Whitehead himself has been astonished that during the progress of his 
philosophy of organism, he was driven to a “(sub)-theory” of God.14 Whitehead’s 
philosophy of organism comes with – or is? - a general ontology. Concerning the 
concept of Whitehead’s God, ontology is in the driver’s seat. The most important 
                                                          
12 Hartshorne (1948). The citation alludes to the above mentioned passage of the Proslogion. 
13 A good overview and classification of those concepts can be found in Schärtl (2016: 6). 
14 See Ford (1977: 27). 
“GOD´S ACTING UPON THE WORLD”  
179 
 
players of this ontology are actual entities and eternal objects.15 Actual entities enjoy a 
remarkable amount of autonomy: they determine themselves “how to become” and 
with that, by mutual cooperation, they determine how “the world” becomes. The 
self-determination depends on the actual entity’s prehension of eternal entities (that 
are, roughly, ideal possibilities of how to become). Due to this prehension they form 
(or choose) their initial aims. An actual entity’s initial aim must fit its past, its physical 
pole. The actual entities themselves determine the aim of their becoming and it is 
their activity to reach their aim. By this, they co-create their world.  
In order that the world – a world of a multitude of actual entities, each of 
which being rather autonomous - evolves orderly as a whole, the actual entities’ 
physical poles (making up the past of evolving world) and initial aims (their 
possibilities how to become) must mutually fit. Here, imbedded in this ontology, 
Whitehead’s God has a twofold role: as, to use Whitehead’s technical terms, primordial 
nature of God and as consequent nature of God.16 The interplay of these two functions 
grant that Whitehead’s world or universe evolves in an ordered way: by the consequent 
nature, the whole past is recorded, by the primordial nature, the eternal entities are 
recorded. By God, as the co-functioning of the primordial and the consequent nature of 
God, the eternal entities that are adequate for co-framing a future in continuity to the 
past are presented to the actual entities. By choosing among them, the actual entities 
not only choose their individual futures – in continuity with their individual pasts -, 
their individual choices lead also to an ordered evolution of the whole. Whitehead’s 
God is the “moderator” of the individual actual entities’ choices and co-creator of the 
world’s evolution. By this, He grants the orderly – if not law-like – evolution of the 
world. He presents to the actual entities the appropriate eternal entities and with 
this’ appropriate (candidates for) the initial aims to realize. 
Viewed from a structural and architectonic perspective, Whitehead’s ontology 
has everything, a world, for being acted upon locally and directly by a God must have: 
Robust individuals that change and, moreover, they are the individual sources of their 
changes. These changes, local events, take place within an overall framework and 
render the whole somehow “temporal”. Actual entities are spontaneous and 
autonomous with respect to their evolution. The “world” can harbor these acts of 
spontaneity and autonomy. These are minimal conditions which for an ontology to 
allow for local and direct acting from within. How it explains these minimal 
conditions, how it makes them coherent, may vary from theory to theory. Whitehead’s 
ontology is a rather strong and elaborate theory that meets these requirements. Due 
                                                          
15 The ontological interplay of Whitehead’s actual entities or actual occasions is described by Griffin 2002 
[1998], p. 138 as follows: “Whitehead portrayed each enduring individual from a human mind to an 
electron, as a rapidly repeating series of ‘occasions of experience’, each of which begins as an open 
window (the actual entity, CS), into which rush influences from the past world. Once this efficient 
causation has constituted the occasion’s ‘physical pole’, the occasion makes its own self-determined 
response, which is its ‘mental pole’. When the occasion’s self-determination is completed, it becomes 
an object for subsequent occasions, exerting efficient causation on them” (2002: 138). 
16 Whitehead (1978: 46). 
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to its strength, it is taken as the ontological, mundane, platform for theisms that 
conceive of their God as responsive to the “world”.  
Whitehead’s God is an actual entity among others.17 But He is set apart from 
other actual entities by the special role He plays with respect to the whole.18  
Concerning “God’s acting upon the world”, Whitehead’s theory may also serve 
as a platform.  By his consequent nature He is responsive to the world but this 
responsiveness ensues in presenting the (candidates for) initial aims to the other 
actual entities. In this, to coin a slogan, He is acting by attracting. This way of acting 
is local and direct.19 By functioning as initial aims, the eternal objects “forming” the 
initial aim must be given relevance and with this an “existent character”. This is 
achieved by God’s “conceptually realizing” them, by His primordial nature: “It is 
God’s conceptual realization performing an efficacious rôle in multiple unifications 
of the universe, […].”20 This way of acting is also local and direct. Whitehead’s God acts 
upon the world in two different ways. Within this theoretical framework, the answer 
to the question “How is it possible that God acts upon the world?” simply is: What 
else could he do? 
 
III. How to Decide? – A Metaphysical Perspective 
 
Any decision on behalf of God’s acting vs. not acting upon the world is at once a 
decision on behalf of the presupposed “God-world”-relation, transcendent vs. 
immanent. By this, it is also a decision between different metaphysical, theoretical 
frameworks - coming with different ontologies and with different concepts of God. 
How to decide the issue? On what basis – or “criteria” - should one decide? Before 
this question is taken up, some methodological preliminaries to sharpen the issue 
should be considered.  
 
III. (i) Deciding and Criteria 
 
Deciding, as a theoretical procedure, is based on criteria. A warning is appropriate: 
“Criteria” is not to be understood in a narrowly empirical sense, as e.g. observations 
and measurement with respect to empirical theories. This would neither fit 
metaphysical theories nor theological theories. Generally, criteria are encoded within 
the respective methodologies. This is a topic of its own and may be left to one side 
here. Criteria for deciding, however, must make a difference if they are applied to the 
“decision-problem”. There are two different sorts of criteria, internal and external 
ones. The internal criteria do not make a difference with respect to the decision-
                                                          
17 “The actual world must always mean the community of all actual entities, including the primordial 
actual entity called ‘God’ and the temporal actual entities.” Whitehead (1978: 65). 
18 Griffin (2002: 136). 
19 Here some similarities with Bishop’s and Perszyk’s euteleological concept of God. (Bishop and 
Perszyk 2016: 119). But their acting by attracting is not local. For interpretation, cf. Löffler (2014). 
20 Whitehead (1978: 349). 
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problem, the external criteria do, since they give an answer, how the theories fare 
with data. In the present context, there are two kinds of data: data relevant for 
theology, as are biblical roots, religious practices, etc. and non-theological data. Since 
the decision-problem here is seen from a metaphysical point of view, non-theological 
data will be relevant. The passages to come will be more explicit about this. 
 
III. (ii) Coherence – An Internal Criterion 
 
An important criterion for metaphysical theories is coherence. It is the internal 
criterion. Coherence has three important aspects which cannot be separated from 
each other: a methodological21 one – guiding the process of theorizing -, an 
architectural one and a semantic one. The architectural and semantic reading is at 
stake here. It is taken from Whitehead: “ ‘Coherence’, as here employed, means that 
the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each 
other so that in isolation they are meaningless.”22 It should be read in context with his 
characterization metaphysics of his “speculative philosophy”: 
 
“Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary 
system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be 
interpreted. By this notion of ‘interpretation’ I mean that everything of which we are 
conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a 
particular instance of the general scheme.” (Whitehead 1978: 3). 
 
From an architectural point of view, coherence points to the assumption that the 
“universe of discourse” is one - that it has no gaps. This has important semantic 
consequences: Each “proposition”, each “phrase”, each “notion” of a metaphysical 
theory gets its semantic value only within the metaphysical theory whose member it 
is, irrespective of the use of the words or phrases with respect to the  (natural) 
language that serves for formulating theory, e.g. English; the same words may have – 
and generally have if they are important - different semantic values with respect to 
different theories. Leaning on Puntel‘s characterization of the „context-principle“, the 
sematic consequences of23  coherence can be expressed as follows: “Only within the 
framework of a theory, ‘propositions’, ‘phrases’, ‘words’, and so on, have meaning.” 
Coherence is a condition sine qua non for theories submitted for decision, as are other 
internal criteria: clarity, argumentative strength and transparency, obeying the 
                                                          
21 Puntel calls the methodological character of his structural-systematic Philosophy coherentist and sets 
it decisively apart from  foundationalist methodological ideals: “[…] the project pursued here is not 
foundationalist, but instead coherentist, which means that there is no reliance on putatively fundamental 
truths that are presented at the outset as true, that hold throughout and that, […], would establish as 
true, as they emerged, all of the additional theses or theories that were components of the ultimate 
system.” (emph. CS) (2008: 51). 
22 Whitehead (1978: 3). 
23 “Only within the context of a sentence do linguistic terms have semantic value” (Puntel 2008: 200). 
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presupposed logic, etc. By this, coherence and internal criteria in general cannot 
make any difference with respect to “God’s acting” vs. “God’s not acting”. Theories 
embedding either of these options should be coherent.  
 
III. (iii) Data – External Criteria 
 
Coherence points crucially to the circumstance that metaphysical theories – during 
theory-building - have to incorporate “data” that are – initially – external. In 
principle data are “everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, 
willed, or thought”. By incorporation, and so unavoidably by interpretation, they are 
conceived from within the framework while contributing to “enlarge” the 
framework. By this, external data get their theoretical formulation and by this a 
modification. That is, data are not fundamental truths that are starters of a theory, 
remaining unaffected during the process of theorizing.  
Incorporating, and by this, respecting data points to another criterion for 
metaphysical theories, their adequacy, i. e.: how good or bad theories fare with data. 
With adequacy, one faces an “external criterion”. This poses methodological 
problems of its own for metaphysical theories in general: on an appropriate level of 
generality everything is a datum. Fortunately, this topic must not be addressed here, 
since the relevant data are neither general nor unlimited in number: the relevant data 
are the biblical narratives, religious practices, traditions and beliefs.24 Here is a 
twofold  point of departure: [1] Whereas classical theisms integrate the data 
emphasizing those, which point to God’s transcendence, aseity and perfection, 
alternative theisms emphasize data that point to His responsiveness, His immanence. 
This leads to different concepts of God and with this to different theories about His 
acting or not acting upon the world. Deciding on behalf of the question concerning 
God’s acting is at once deciding which data are more and which are less relevant for 
theorizing and, a fortiori, a deciding on behalf of both, the “God-world”-relation and 
the concept of God adequate for theological purposes. The impasse remains: Given 
that the frameworks at stake are coherent, clear and share any virtue a 
(metaphysical) theory can have, the point of decision for theology is how they fare 
with the data and new data – i.e. the biblical roots, the religious practices and the 
tradition - are not to be expected. By this, theology has also to decide which of the 
data are more and which are less important. Theology has also to decide how much 
revision concerning the reading of the data, it is inclined to accept. Adherents of 
classical theisms, on the one hand, and of alternative theisms, on the other, simply 
disagree in that respect. Both families of theoretical frameworks are revisionary with 
respect to the reading of the data. Classical theisms revise data concerning religious 
                                                          
24 Catholic theology counts also its (theoretical) ecclesial tradition, especially its dogmatic 
presuppositions as data of great importance. But, during the course of history, these data themselves 
became theory-laden by classical theism. If classical theism(s) is (are) at stake, as it is here, then from a 
philosophical point of view, theoretical ecclesial tradition and its dogmatic presuppositions cannot 
count as data. 
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practices and attitudes, alternative theisms are more revisionary with respect to the 
ecclesial tradition. Both, however, conceive of their theoretical notion of God as 
expressing the God of the bible and paint a rather specific and elaborate picture of 
Him. Deciding the issue based on these theological data is a theological decision-
problem, not a metaphysical or philosophical one.  
[2] In theorizing about “God” in general and in deciding on behalf of its 
“acting upon the world”, there is a difference between metaphysics and theoretical 
theology, even if theology avails itself of metaphysics. The difference does not 
concern the methodological demands and virtues – as are clarity, coherence, 
inferential correctness and cognates. It concerns the pre-theoretic data to be respected 
by the theory and with this a decision which of the data are revisable and which are 
not – whose pre-theoretic notions should be preserved as far as possible. For 
theology important data are, as mentioned above, documents of revelation, biblical 
narratives, religious practices and beliefs, etc. Metaphysics, in contrast, is not 
committed to these data – there is no pre-theoretic notion of God that is to be 
accommodated for. If it develops a notion of God and this metaphysical God must 
not be “co-referential” with the theological or any pre-theoretic notion of God.  
Metaphysic’s God is self-made and so his notion cannot serve as an external 
criterion for the metaphysical decision-problem on behalf of God’s acting vs. His not 
acting upon the world. Any metaphysical theory that is coherent and incorporates 
“God”, “acting”, “world” and their interplay (leading to acting locally and directly or 
not), however, includes a sub-theory of “world”. “World” is not metaphysically self-
made, and so, hopefully, how the theories fare with incorporating “world” may serve 
as an indirect external criterion for deciding the issue. Basically, the decision is based 
on an answer to the question: which ontology fares better with the non-theological 
data. Unfortunately, this move does not work. 
 
III. (iv) Leibniz – the Basics of his Metaphysical Framework 
 
At first sight, comparing classical theisms’ presupposed theory of the “world” – a 
substance-ontology, basically an ancient or medieval ontology – with Whitehead’s 
ontology, a 20th-century-theory that is up to respect scientific theories of its time, 
seems utterly unfair. Whitehead’s approach and with this, “God’s acting upon the 
world” would be favoured.  Fortunately, there is a brand of classical theism whose 
“God-world”-relation is transcendent, unique as indicating creation ex nihilo, and whose 
God is an omniGod, impassible, a-temporal, etc., who does not act locally and directly 
upon the world: Leibniz’ late theory. This theory comes with a strong ontology, as the 
short presentation to follow will indicate.25 
The first thing to notice is that Leibniz’ God is a transcendent God (and He is the 
ens perfectissimum). But He is not simple – His “mind” is internally variegated, He 
contemplates different alternatives, He has “will”, different from His “mind”. Leibniz 
                                                          
25 For details see for monads (Schneider 2001: 17) and for conceptus completi (2001: 150). 
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is a classical theist in the liberal sense presupposed here. The perfections, making up 
Leibniz’ God’s nature are simple but different from each other. Transcendence is basic 
for his concept of God, not inferred from other “attributes” of His God. Leibniz was 
struggling to preserve God’s transcendence in his metaphysics and he thought that he 
has won the fight by “inventing” his monads, the monadic world. Monads and the 
monadic world are created by God ex nihilo. A citation of C. Wilson may be instructive: 
 
“Spinoza was in a sense Leibniz‘ ghost. He was what Leibniz was afraid of being and 
saw himself of dangerously; the doctrine that God was in some way related to 
creatures as as a whole to its parts, not as an extra item, was one which obsessed him. 
“If there has been no monads”, he wrote to Bourguet once, “Spinoza would have 
been right.”“ (Wilson 1989: 89).  
 
What are the monads, the core of Leibniz’ ontology? Monads are “soul-like” entities. 
Monads are mutually aware of each other, but this awareness is not necessarily 
conscious. Leibniz calls it perception. They change in striving from one of their 
perceptual web to “the next”. This is their appetitus. They are the sources of their 
changes. In his Discours de la Metaphysique, Leibniz characterizes a monad also as a vis 
activa. Moreover, monads have no efficient-causal impact on each other.  
There are three classes of Monads: Simple monads: They have only (simple, 
i.e. completely unconscious) perception and appetite. Souls: They have also 
awareness or „memory“. Spirits: They have also apperception and access to the ideas 
in the mind of God. This access is a strictly asymmetric relation. 
Perceptions are unified internally variegated representations of the monadic 
world; they come with different degrees of clarity and distinctness. Monads are 
individuated by their perceptions and there is not anything over and above than 
monads, their perceptions and their appetites in the world. The world is a web 
mutually perceiving monads, striving – by their appetites - harmoniously to their 
“next” perceptions and with this to the “next” perceptual-monadic web – the next 
state of the “world”.  
This is basically Leibniz’ ontology and it has strong similarities with 
Whitehead’s. For both, their world is made up of entities that are their own source of 
change (monad/vis activa - actual entity). These are mutually “aware” of each other 
(perception – physical prehension). By this, they make up the respective “worlds” 
(perceptual-monadic world - nexus).  
For Whitehead eternal entities, platonic forms26 are the model of them, play an 
important role. By His primordial nature, Whitehead’s God “thinks” them. They 
express what actual entities strive for to become, the actual entities’ initial aims. 
Whitehead’s God presents to each actual entity the eternal enities that are adequate for 
                                                          
26 Cf. Whitehead (1978: 44), but he is aware of the problematic connected with “form”: “any entity 
whose conceptual recognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual entity of 
the temporal world is called an ‘eternal object’.” 
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initial aims. They are grasped by conceptual prehension. This corresponds to Leibniz’ 
appetite, as Whitehead himself admits (cf. 1978: 32).  
Eternal objects/initial aims play a similar role as the ideas/concepts in Leibniz’ 
God’s mind. Ideas/concepts are not necessarily universal, they express also singular 
and “contingent” possible facts; they can be regarded as semantic values. They serve 
to regulate and harmonize the appetites and the evolving of the monadic world; they 
are also responsible for the “law-likeness” of the monadic world. Ideas are in Leibniz’ 
God’s mind and form different possible worlds there. Each of the possible worlds can be 
regarded as a maximally consistent set of ideas. Each possible world has its intrinsic 
“degree” of “goodness”. One and only one of them is the “best”. Leibniz’ God “sees” 
which possible world is the best one and creates the monadic world ex nihilo 
accordingly. The best of all possible worlds, as an ideal construct, remains as it is in 
God’s mind and is somehow a blue-print for creation:  
 
“[...] il est visible que ce decret (to create the world, CS)] ne change rien dans la 
constitution des choses, et qu'il les laisse telles qu'elles étoient dans l'état de pure 
possibilité, c'est à dire qu'il ne change rien, ny dans leur essence ou nature, ny même 
dans leur accidens, representés déja parfaitement dans l'idée de ce monde possible.”27 
 
Leibniz’ God is transcendent. 
The best of all possible worlds contains conceptus completi. These encode 
whatever may truly be said about a monad – during its history, including its 
relations to the rest of the monadic world. The relation of a conceptus completus to its 
monad can be compared to the program of a software for a computer (conceptus 
completus) to its hardware (monad) – with a crucial difference for any hardware there 
is one and only one software and vice versa. Leibniz’ conceptus completi play a similar 
role as Whitehead’s initial aims: they present to the monad how to become. God is 
their host and by thinking (and willing) them, they become relevant for the becoming 
of the monadic world. 
 
III. (v) Summing Up 
 
Leibniz’ and Whitehead’s ontologies are very similar.28 From an architectural point of 
view, Leibniz’ God and Whitehead’s God plays the same role: They are the hosts of 
ideas/eternal entities, present them to the (different) inhabitants (monads – actual 
entities) of their worlds, to “show” them how to become (conceptus completus, initial 
aim) at each instant of their history. Leibniz’ theism and Whitehead’s approach, 
                                                          
27 Leibniz, Theodizee, GP IV, p. 131. 
28 There is a difference, however: Leibniz is a determinist, whereas Whitehead can be interpreted as 
allowing the actual entities to choose their initial aims among different possible ones. One may, 
however, go beyond Leibniz, preserving his basic ontology and allowing for libertarian freedom. An 
approach, albeit in different material contexts, can be found in: (Schneider 2009) and  (Brüntrup and 
Schneider 2016).  This can be done coherently with God’s transcendence, cf. Schneider (2013).  
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however, are different in an important respect: Leibniz’ God is transcendent and so, his 
God does not act upon the world, directly, locally and creative. Whitehead’s God is 
immanent, responsive, and so, his God acts upon the world, directly, locally and 
creative. In this case, due to the extremely similar ontology, from a 
metaphysical/philosophical point of view, there is no methodologically corroborated 
decision between God’s acting and God’s not acting or between His transcendence 
and His immanence. If Leibniz’ ontology fares good/bad with the non-theological data, 
then, Whitehead’s ontology also does and vice versa. This is not a coincidence germane 
to Leibniz and Whitehead. 
 
IV Classical Theisms’ Ontological Neutrality and a Consequence 
 
Classical theisms’ notions of God are in principle neutral with respect to their worlds’ 
(or philosophies’) ontologies. Of course, the use of notions, categories and their 
interplay of a basically Aristotelian ontology to interpret and to explain important 
articles of faith is rooted in the historic predominance classical theism(s). But, 
metaphysically, it is not committed to a special ontology, as Leibniz’ metaphysical 
framework shows. Characterizing classical theisms as theisms whose God is 
transcendent (and an omniGod), then there is, as mentioned above, basically one and 
only one relation from God to the world that makes a difference: God’s creatio ex 
nihilo. All other relations of God to the world – if there should be any – neither affect 
the created world nor God’s internal structure (if there is any). Relations from the 
world (or their inhabitants) to God may affect mundane affairs, but never God. 
Creating ex nihilo has as consequence that there is no restriction “external to God” of 
how the world up for creation should be. This implies that any ontology – provided 
it fits the mundane affairs at an appropriate level of generality - can be regarded as 
expressing a creatio ex nihilo of a classical theisms’ God.  
Metaphysical frameworks, in contrast, that conceive of their God as being 
immanent – not least to make sense of His responsiveness to the “world” - depend 
crucially on formulating a (or presupposing) a refined ontology. Otherwise, to exhibit 
coherence as well as adequacy with respect to mundane data would be idle. By this, 
their ontology – as a theory about the “world” – can be also a classical theism’s 
ontology (about the “world”). Leibniz’ and Whitehead’s ontologies are points in case.  
Consequently, “God’s not acting upon the world” vs. “His acting upon the world”, of 
God being transcendent  vs. His being immanent, cannot be decided  by metaphysics – 
irrespective of the specific metaphysical framework that incorporates a God who acts            
directly, locally and creatively upon the world. It is theology’s decision. 
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